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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Dustin L. James appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance. Specifically, Mr. James contends that the district court erred 
when it denied his motion to suppress because he was subject to custodial interrogation 
in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedincrs 
At approximately 1:30 a.m. on March 6, 2005, a vehicle was stopped on 
Interstate 84 in Elmore County. (Prelim. Tr., p.2, L.20 - p.3, ~ .8 . ) '  Officer Shaun 
Sterling was called to assist. (Prelim. Tr., p.2, Ls. 23-25.) By the time Officer Sterling 
arrived, all of the individuals had been removed from the vehicle. (Prelim. Tr., p.3, 
Ls.12-13.) Officer Sterling obtained consent to search the vehicle from its owner. 
(Prelim. Tr., p.3, Ls.15-20.) He found a "hair scrunchy" in the back seat; inside the 
scrunchy was a "clear plastic baggie with a substance on the inside." (Prelim. Tr., p.4, 
L.3 - p.5, L.5.) Officer Sterling suspected that the baggie contained a controlled 
substance. (Prelim. Tr., p.6, Ls.8-22.) 
In an effort "to find out who had the substance," Officer Sterling asked all of the 
determined individuals whose property it was. (Prelim. Tr., p.8, Ls.13-19.) He got no 
immediate response. (Prelim. Tr., p.8, Ls.20-22.) Officer Sterling then told the group 
that if someone did not confess to ownership of the scrunchy that he would arrest them 
all. (Prelim. Tr., p.18, L.23 - p.19, L.2.) In response, Mr. James, a passenger in the 
1 The district court took judicial notice of the preliminary hearing transcript at the hearing on the motion to 
suppress. (R., p.53.) 
I 
vehicle, stated, "Iolkay, if you are going to take Mr. Henage [the driver] to jail, then, he's 
on probation, i don't want him to go jail, so 1 will take responsibility." (Prelim. Tr., p.19, 
Ls.3-8.) Mr. James was then arrested for possession. (Prelim. Tr., p.19, Ls.9-11.) 
Officer Sterling never provided anyone with Miranda warnings. (Prelim. Tr., p.16, L.23 - 
On October 20, 2005, Mr. James was charged with possession of a controlled 
substance. (R., p.14.) The case was consolidated with another case in which 
Mr. James was charged with possession of paraphernalia. (R., p.35.) 
On March 6, 2006, counsel for Mr. James informed the court that he would be 
filing a motion to suppress. (R., p.37.) Counsel later moved to reset the briefing 
schedule and hearing for the motion to suppress, asserting that he had tried two jury 
trials within the past three weeks and did not have time to file the motion or the brief. 
( R  p . 4 )  The court granted the motion, ordered Mr. James to submit his brief by 
May 15, 2006, and scheduled a hearing for June 20. (R., p.43.) 
Mr. James did not file the motion until June 19, 2006. (R., p.45.) The hearing 
was held the following day. (R., p.47.) He asserted that he was questioned without 
being advised of his Miranda rights and that the questions were not reasonably related 
to the basis for the traffic stop. (R., p.46.) Counsel for Mr. James apologized to the 
court and counsel, stating: 
I think we have set this thing over twice already and due to my negligence 
and getting timely motions and briefs filed, I understand that the State is 
not prepared to go forward based on my untimely filing of these matters. I 
am just glad I finally got the dag gone thing filed and I don't think the State 
is going to object to an ultimate decision on the merits or further testimony, 
I believe they want the time to respond to my motion and brief. 
(Tr., p.1, Ls.10-20.) However, the State objected to the motion and brief because they 
were filed after the established deadline. (Tr., p.1, Ls.21-25.) The court noted that it 
"has no more ability to waive its own deadline in the absence of a showing of good 
cause than it does to enter any order in an untimely matter and the Court is stuck with 
its own scheduling orders." (Tr., p.3, Ls.5-8.) The court concluded that it "cannot 
consider the late filed materials. I can certainly listen to both counsel's argument right 
now, so that is what I will do." (Tr., p.3, Ls.16-20.) 
Counsel for Mr. James argued that, since a Fourth Amendment seizure had 
occurred, Mr. James was in custody and subject to interrogation from Officer Sterling. 
(Tr., p.4, L.19 - p.5, L.1.) The State asserted that Mr. James was never in custody for 
purposes of Miranda and therefore no warnings were required. (Tr., p.6, Ls.10-14.) 
The district court denied the motion, holding that, "once the officer located the 
drugs and paraphernalia he was justified in questioning the individuals who were in the 
car as he was attempting to decide who to arrest by finding out who had knowledge of 
the drugs and paraphernalia in the back seat, and whose property it was." (R., p.59.) 
Specifically, the court held that Mr. James was not in custody so Miranda did not apply. 
(R., p.58.) 
Mr. James entered into a conditional guilty plea in which he preserved the right to 
appeal from the denial of his motion to suppress. (R., p.65.) This appeal followed. 
(~ugmentation') Mr. James asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to 
suppress because he was subject to custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda. 




Did the district court err when it denied Mr. James's motion to suppress because he was 
subject to custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda? 
ARGUMENT 
1. 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. James's Motion To Suppress Because He 
Was Subiect To Custodial lnterroaation In Violation Of Miranda 
A. Introduction 
Mr. James asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress 
because he was subject to custodial interrogation without being advised of his rights 
pursuant to Miranda. 
6. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. James's Motion To Suppress 
Because He Was Subiect To Custodial Interrogation in Violation Of Miranda 
The following constitute the district court's findings of fact: 
The defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped for possible 
driving under the influence. During a search of the vehicle, the officer 
found what he suspected to be a controlled substance and drug 
paraphernalia. The defendant was then questioned about the items. The 
defendant was then arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia with 
intent to use, and was searched incident to that arrest. 
(R., p.54.) While the district court did not make any specific finding as to what Officer 
Sterling told Mr. James, Officer Sterling agreed that he told the group, including 
Mr. James, that if someone did not confess to ownership of the scrunchy that he would 
arrest them all. (Prelim. Tr., p.18, L.23 - p.19, L.2.) Miranda rights were never given. 
(Prelim. Tr., p.16, L.23 - p.17, L.1.) Mr. James does not believe the facts to be in 
dispute. 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated." Sfate v. Holland, 
135 Idaho 159, 161, 15 P.3d 1167, 1169 (2000). When a decision on a motion to 
suppress is challenged, the appellate court should "accept the trial court's findings of 
fact which were supported by substantial evidence, but freely review the application of 
constitutional principles to the facts as found." Id. 
Counsel Mr. James moved to suppress only the statements he made to Officer 
Sterling, conceding that "my client probably does not have standing to suppress the 
methamphetamine . . ." (Tr., p.5, Ls.3-8.) "Our position [is] that the statement received 
by the officer from [Mr. James] is entitled to suppression." (Tr., p.5, Ls.8-9.) 
"The law is settled that in Fourth Amendment terms a traffic stop entails a 
seizure of the driver even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting 
detention quite brief."' Brendlin v. California, - U.S. -, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2406 (2007) 
(quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). The passengers of the vehicle 
are seized as well. Id. at 2406-07. Therefore, being a passenger in a vehicle subject to 
a traffic stop, Mr. James had been seized. 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the United States Supreme Court 
held that, to effectuate the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self- 
incrimination, police must inform individuals of their right to remain silent and their right 
to counsel before undertaking a custodial interrogation. For purposes of Miranda, 
persons are "in custody" when they have been arrested or when their freedom of action 
"is curtailed to a 'degree associated with formal arrest.' " Berkemer v. McCarfy, 468 U.S. 
420, 440 (1984) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)); Sfafe v. 
Medrano, 123 ldaho 114,117, 844 P.2d 1364,1367 (Ct. App. 1992). 
In determining whether a suspect is in custody, the relevant inquiry is "how a 
reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation." 
Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442. See also State v. Albaugh, 133 ldaho 587,591, 990 P.2d 
753, 757(Ct. App. 1999). The totality of the circumstances must be examined, which 
may include the location of the interrogation, the conduct of the officers, the nature and 
manner of the questioning, the time of the interrogation, and other persons present. 
Medrano, 123 ldaho at 117-118, 844 P.2d at 1367-1368. 
Generally, roadside questioning of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop does not 
amount to a custodial interrogation for Miranda purposes. Albaugh, 133 ldaho at 592, 
990 P.2d at 758. (citing Berkemer, 468 U.S. 420; State v. Pilik, 129 ldaho 50, 921 P.2d 
750 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Myers, 118 ldaho 608, 798 P.2d 453 (Ct. App. 1990)). 
However, the totality of the circumstances can transform questioning pursuant to a 
traffic stop into custodial interrogation. See People v. Patel, 730 N.E.2d 582, 586 (111. 
App. 2 Dist. 2000) ("Officer Rivkin's decision to question the passenger of the detained 
vehicle regarding matters not germane to the initial traffic stop transformed this situation 
into a custodial interrogation outside the ambit of Berkemer.") The factors to be 
considered in distinguishing an investigative stop from a de facto arrest include the 
seriousness of the crime, the location of the encounter, the length of the detention, the 
reasonableness of the officer's display of force, and the conduct of the suspect as the 
encounter unfolds. State v. Martinez, 129 ldaho 426, 431, 925 P.2d 1125, 1130 
(Ct. App. 1996). 
Mr. James asserts was in custody once Officer Sterling threatened to arrest him. 
At that point, Mr. James had two options: 1) he could say nothing, and be arrested; or 
2) he could speak, and be arrested. Under these circumstances, where Mr. James 
knew that, regardless of what he said, he would be arrested, that his freedom had been 
curtailed to the extent associated with a formal arrest because he knew, one way or 
another, he was going to be taken into custody. He asserts that the deputy's actions 
took this case outside the ambit of Berkemer and subjected him to custodial 
interrogation without being apprised of his Miranda rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. James respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction 
and reverse the order denying his motion to suppress 
DATED this loth dav of October. 2007. 
Deputy $ta Appellate Public Defender P 
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